Recent Articles Return to Recent Articles Menu THE NUCLEAR CRUCIBLE: THE MORAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Terrence Edward Paupp, J.D. [National Chancellor of the United States for, The International Association of Educators for World Peace (IAEWP) (2001-2005); Vice-President of the Association of World Citizens (AWC) (2005- ); Consultant to the World Conference of Mayors for Peace (2004-present)] [NOTE: This article is a published chapter in, In Democracy's Shadow: The Secret World of National Security, Nation Books, c. 2005, edited by Marcus Raskin and Carl LeVan] INTRODUCTION The advent of the nuclear age has virtually erased the moral boundaries that have acted as a constraint on human decision making with respect to war. The rise of technological society has elevated the place of "technique" as the guiding force for both technology and political discourse in the atomic age. As a consequence, an historical alteration has been effectively accomplished: technology has been transformed into the new theology and theology and moral argument have been subsumed under the umbrella of technological discourse. Jacques Ellul identified this trend in his book, The Technological Society, in which he observed that, "technical autonomy is apparent in respect to morality and spiritual values. Technique tolerates no judgment from without and accepts no limitation...Morality judges moral problems; as far as technical problems are concerned, it has nothing to say. Only technical criteria are relevant. Technique in sitting in judgment on itself, is clearly freed from this principal obstacle to human action"(Ellul, 1964, p.134). By virtue of this divorce of moral constraint from decisions made where nuclear technology resides, augmented by the ideological matrix constructed by military state capitalism, our common humanity is negated by the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. It is the negation of our common humanity that depicts what I call "the nuclear crucible". The nuclear crucible is most easily identified by its visible manifestations---the expenditure of wealth to feed its insatiable research and development, production and deployment. Yet, it is more covertly experienced in mankind's unconscious fears and desire for an elusive sense of security. The search for security in the nuclear age also reveals the human capacity for imagination as a guiding inspiration for strategies based upon force and the search for moral justifications to vindicate its use. In this sense, "strategies may belong to the realm of imagination. But preparations for an imaginary war are real enough. The imaginary war consists of real soldiers, weapons, arms manufacturers and scientists pretending to fight a war. And because this drama involves substantial real resources, it constitutes a form of economic intervention; it can be treated as a mechanism for regulation" (Kaldor, 1990, p.212). The dimensions of imaginary war in the nuclear age have virtually escaped the domain of meaningful control. In part, the success of this escape may be credited to psychological mechanisms for denial and the lack of a countervailing moral argument against the research for weapons of mass destruction as well as their production and deployment. In this respect, "man unconsciously invests with a holy prestige that against which he is unable to prevail" (Ellul, 2000, p.27). Hence, the nuclear crucible, from a moral perspective, reveals the hidden terrors of insecurity materially being manifested in the production of weapons of mass destruction that are the very antithesis of security and life affirming values. In short, the nuclear crucible exposes the reality that "the further technical progress advances, the more the social problem of mastering this progress becomes one of an ethical and spiritual kind" (Ellul, 2000, p.26). Certainly, technical progress further highlights the moral crisis associated with the nuclear crucible, but it also places in starker contrast an age-old ethical dilemma, which Christendom has had to face ever since its inception---the paradox between religious pacifism versus the claims of a doctrine of "just war". In his book, Nuremberg and Vietnam, Telford Taylor comments on the original paradox of Christianity and organized violence: "During the first three centuries after Christ's death there grew up among his followers a strong school of religious pacifism. Moreover, the early Christians were a religious minority in a pagan state. For this reason the early church leaders condemned all military service as incompatible with Christian life" (Taylor, 1971, p.59). With the dawn of nuclear age, the marriage of weapons of mass destruction to the military industrial complex of the world of nation states has created a global moral and legal crisis. On this point, Bertrand Russell perceptively noted that, "whatever right a country may have to preserve its own form of government in the face of foreign opposition, it cannot, with any justice, claim the right to exterminate many millions in countries which wish to keep out of the quarrel. How can it be maintained that, because many of us dislike communism, we have a right to inflict death on innumerable inhabitants of India and Africa?" (Russell, 1962, p.43). Russell's moral/philosophical critique of the effect of weapons of mass destruction on non-aligned nations and non-combatants may be juxtaposed to Carl Sagan's observation that "nuclear weapons states are unlikely to admit targeting noncombatant nations, but it flows readily enough from what passes for the 'logic' of strategic operations. Even a few nuclear bursts within a nation's borders could produce widespread devastation and unparalleled hardship...Prudent planners in noncombatant nations, aligned and non-aligned, would be wise...to consider such possibilities" (Sagan and Turco, 1990, p.171). These realities represent the intersection of what I am calling "the nuclear crucible"---the moral crisis of opposition to the indiscriminate destruction of life and the crisis of international law to constrain the production, deployment and ultimate use of weapons of mass destruction. The implications are far reaching. Neutral states that lay outside the theatre of war would be affected by nuclear weapons as if they were included. As Nagendra Sing has concluded: "If the German invasion of Belgium was condemned as a violation of international law in the Second World War and declared a war crime, it is submitted that the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances in which the user knows that it is bound to injure neutral States, must be considered as a violation of international law and, if it involves the killing of innocent neutrals, a clear war crime" (Singh, p.26). Moral, political, legal, and technological issues do intersect. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, the intersection of these perspectives, are all elements of the nuclear crucible of the 21st century. The terror of atomic war and indiscriminate civilian carnage, born in the 20th century, rises vampire-like in the 21st century, nurtured by unconstrained technological leaps, legitimated by the doctrines of national security, compelled by the logic of strategic interests and operations, and funded by an armaments culture. While this is not the first time that an armaments culture threatened to engulf all of humanity, it is the first time that technological developments in the instruments of terror could vaporize the planet and inaugurate what some in the scientific community have called, "nuclear winter"---in other words, climatic catastrophe (Sagan and Turco, 1990). It would be the duplication, many thousands of times over, of the first nuclear explosion in the desert of New Mexico where Oppenheimer recalled lines from the Bhagavad-Gita: "If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, That would be like the splendor of the mighty one [Krishna], I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds" (as quoted in, Clarifield and Wiecek, 1984, pp.51-52). Yet, despite the unprecedented radiance of the atomic era and its capacity to destroy life, it is a reality that remains subject to moral scrutiny. As such, it is a reality that has been visited before, in the context of the seizure of state power in the Germany of the 1930s by the Nazi party. Sixty-seven years ago, in response to an acute political and theological crisis, 139 delegates from nineteen territorial churches (Lutheran, Reformed, and United) gathered together in the German Rhineland city of Barmen (now Wuppertal) from May 29 to 31, 1934. The Barmen Confessional Synod (Barmer Bekenntnissynode), was a conference of representatives of Lutheran, Reformed, and United [Protestant] churches, free synods, church congresses [Kirchentage], and congregations. The delegates from a total of 19 among the 28 Evangelical state churches (Landeskirchen) were united in their opposition to the "synchronization" measures of the Reich Church regime under Ludwig Muller. At the time, the delegates may or may not have been aware that they were about to take a historic stand for the faith of the church. They opposed the falsification of Christian doctrine through the National Socialist (NS) racist ideas being imposed by most church leaders with German-Christian leanings. The fact that such an array of divergent Protestant tendencies came together in a common confession for the first time since the 16th century under the pressure of the NS revolution made the Barmen synod effective far beyond the immediacy of the church struggle (Zentner and Bedurftig, 1997, pp.67-68). It reverberates into the 21st century. The delegates placed themselves in an exposed position insofar as they confronted not only the Nazi state and its ideology, but also placed them on a collision course with the fundamental assumptions of academic theology as practiced for nearly two hundred years. Organizationally, the Barmen synod legitimated the bodies of the Confessing Church as counterparts to the German-Christian church regime. What this effectively did was to expose the fact that the delegates "audaciously believed that between what they had to oppose politically and what they had to oppose theologically there existed an intrinsic connection" (Hunsinger, 2000, p.60). To grasp the full meaning and implications of this connection is to comprehend the basis for moral opposition to weapons of mass destruction and the true nature of the nuclear crucible. The nuclear crucible represents an intrinsic moral and political conflict for it demarcates the boundary between life-affirming and life-denying paths of existence. It does so because, as Jonathan Schell has argued, "doom can never be a human purpose at all, truly serious or otherwise, but, rather, is the end of all human purposes, none of which can be fulfilled outside of human life" (Schell, 1982, p.131). Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, it is incumbent upon those who claim a moral and theological identification with principles and values that transcend the claim of the nation state in its claim to engage in the use of weapons of ultimate terror and destruction to forge a 21st century moral critique and political opposition to this claim. For if the intrinsic connection between the moral and political critique to weapons of mass destruction can be articulated, the claims of international human rights law may be triggered as well, thereby building the foundations of a global consensus capable of dismantling the national security states of the globe. In this sense, William Felice's critique of militarism and human rights is highly relevant when he argues "human rights as the core of domestic and foreign policy can provide a route for the achievement of peace and security...Policies based on outmoded notions of realpolitik exacerbate insecurities. The irony is that human rights policies provide the clearest road to achieve the 'realist' objectives of security and stability. Long-term interests in international stability should compel governments to explore human security and positive peace" (Felice, 1998, p.35). At the dawn of the 21st century, we stand in the midst of an acute legal, political and moral crisis. It is acute because "our political situation is more ambiguous and more precarious than that faced by the church in Germany---more ambiguous because we are surrounded by the trappings of democracy, more precarious because we face the prospect not of persecution but of annihilation" (Hunsinger, 2000, p.60). Added to this situation of ambiguity is the fate of international law since Nuremberg. According to Peter Maguire, "in the year 2000, human rights and war crimes only become considerations for U.S foreign policy when they correspond with larger policy objectives, or more commonly, when they turn into public relations problems...Today, despite the most comprehensive set of laws governing war and international relations in human history, the oldest and most basic distinction, the one between soldier and civilian, is fast disappearing" (Maguire, 2000, p.289). However, it may be argued that the distinction between solider and civilian was crossed in 1945 when the first Atom bombs were exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the realm of international law versus political expediency and technological justification/rationalization, the human memory can be short. Historical memory, however, recalls us to the Declaration of St. Petersburg. The declaration was the result of a conference of European military officers who met to take action on a new type of bullet that expanded on entry into the body, causing painful wounds that were hard to treat medically. While an agreement was reached forbidding the use of any projectile of a weight below 400 grams which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substance," (Friedman, Vol. I, 1972, p.192), the conferees also adopted more general principles, which would have a lasting effect upon the development of the laws of war. The Preamble to the Declaration of St. Petersburg specifically prohibits, as contrary to the laws of humanity, the use of weapons which cause unnecessary and excessive suffering. In principle part, it states: "Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disable men, or render their death inevitable; That the employment of such arms would therefore be contrary to laws of humanity" ("Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectiles (1868)," in Friedman, Vol. I, 1972, p.192). Upon reviewing the Preamble to the Declaration of St. Petersburg, Professor Richard Falk and others have argued that the Declaration of St. Petersburg "stands both for the principle that military necessity cannot override the laws of war, and for the idea that warfare is governed by 'the laws of humanity' that are valid even without the consent of governments" (Falk, Meyrowitz, Sanderson, 1980, p.560). Eventually, the precedents established in the Declaration of St. Petersburg found their next embodiment in Article 22 of the Regulations annexed to the IVth Hague Convention of 1907. Set forth in Article 22 was confirmation of the basic principle of the laws of war that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited" (Friedman, 1972, p.318). Given the history, "this general legal conception remains valid and its relevance seems, if anything, greater" (Falk, Meyrowitz, Sanderson, 1980, p.560). It also is a viewpoint which seems to confirm Peter Maguire's assertion that "more laws are not necessary; what is necessary if we are to avoid an even bloodier twenty-first century is the will to enforce the laws that exist" (Maguire, 2000 p.290). In sum, the nuclear crucible is comprised of moral/theological, technological, legal/ethical, and political and economic components. Yet, all of these components are part of two primary parts: Moral and Legal. This chapter is dedicated to explicating the conjunction between the moral and legal aspects of weapons of mass destruction. For just as the Barmen Declaration has laid an ethical and theological basis for moral opposition to the production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, so too the Declaration of St. Petersburg and its prodigy have fostered an international law critique and condemnation of weapons of mass destruction. At the core of the nuclear crucible, the moral and legal implications of weapons of mass destruction converge to rebuke indulgence in any further rationalizations for their production, use and deployment. Rather, it is their abolition that is demanded by morality and international law. This chapter begins with the moral critique of nuclear technology and its attendant modes of political reasoning and decision-making. It incorporates a discussion of the socioeconomic costs of this kind of investment. By so doing, it raises questions about the moral trajectory of individual states and that of the international community. The chapter concludes with an overview of the international law aspects of weapons of mass destruction and some proposals for demilitarization and nuclear abolition. THE MORAL CRUCIBLE In the long history of war, the sanction of the Christian church to sacrifice oneself for one's neighbor at God's command is transformed into permission to sacrifice one's neighbor for God's sake. In the post-1945 world, with the perspective of history, it is clear that "in the pre-nuclear world, the assumption of these claims led to considerable slaughter; in the nuclear world, it could lead to the end of the species"(Schell, 1982, p.133). As former Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Robert McNamara has admitted that mistakes are costly and "in conventional war, they cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if mistakes were to affect decisions related to the use of nuclear forces, there would be no learning period. They would result in the destruction of entire nations. Therefore, I strongly believe that the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a very high risk of a potential nuclear catastrophe" McNamara and Blight, 2001, p.191). If this combination was analytically broken down still further it would reveal that "continued possession will fuel proliferation; proliferation will fuel hope for missile defense; missile defense (whether it can work or not) will disrupt arms control; and the disruption of arms control will, completing the circle, fuel proliferation" (Schell, 2001, p.15). With the dawn of the G.W. Bush era, "a second nuclear age has dawned, and it is running out of control" (Id., p.15). Sacrifices are still called for in the 21st century, but rarely have the publics of nations or the international community been invited to participate in the discourse of nuclear Armageddon. Rather, the discourse is an elite discourse, which I have called "exclusionary governance" (Paupp, 2000, pp.51-112). Further, I have argued that "the growth of the military sector in developing countries negatively affects their economic equilibrium. In large measure, this is a consequence of the exclusionary and antidemocratic features of global militarization which intensify and deepen the very structural distortions which that produce disequilibria in the first place." (Id., p.56). In outline, I have suggested six central dimensions characteristic of exclusionary governance: (1) weak states; (2) fragmented civil society; (3) shifting power coalitions; (4) short term policies; (5) elite-led pacts; (6) "rule by law" in place of "rule of law" (p.404). These dimensions are characteristic of not only Third World contexts, where the military negatively affects their economic equilibrium, but also advanced industrial and post-industrial states, regardless of their ideological persuasion. In this sense, Hitler's Third Reich and the practice of exclusionary democracy in the national security state apparatus of the United States (post-1945) have much in common. For example, in the case of developing countries, "there is a structural bias toward repressive rule associated with leadership...there is little toleration of oppositional activities or dissent" (Falk, 1981, p.131; Paupp, pp.151-416). In the case of Hitler's dictatorship, it could be argued "the regime developed no consistent social policy and was in essentially a weak position when faced with the logic of the economic class struggle and the need to square the circle of paying for armaments without drastic reductions in consumer spending (Kershaw, 2000, p.88). From this perspective, the Third Reich was actually a weak regime insofar as "the weakness of the regime...went to the very heart of its ethos---war---and limited its potential to such an extent that it could be argued that the regime's destruction was not simply a matter of external defeat, but was implicit in its essence---was 'structurally determined' by its internal contradictions" (Id., p.89). Still, there is the question of intention, as well as structure, and intention goes to the issue of moral considerations, political commitment, and a larger vision of purpose and principle. In this regard, Ian Kershaw argues that "intention" and "structure" are "both essential elements of an explanation of the Third Reich, and need synthesis rather than to be set in opposition to each other. Hitler's 'intentions' seem above all important in shaping a climate in which the unleashed dynamic turned them into a self-fulfilling prophesy" (Kershaw, 2000, p.92). In this regard, some scholars have even argued that the Third Reich provides a classic demonstration of Marx's dictum: "Men do make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, nor under conditions of their own choosing, but rather under circumstances which they find before them, under given and imposed conditions" (Id., p.92; Marx, 1954, p.10). In the case of the national security bureaucracy of the United States and the post-1945 armaments culture that it spawned, an analogy may be made to the fascism of the Third Reich. While the democratic culture of the United States would not allow for the excesses of German fascism, a form of "friendly fascism" was introduced into the governmental apparatus of the United States with antidemocratic consequences for its larger political, cultural, social, and economic life. Friendly fascism may be defined as "a slow and powerful drift toward greater concentration of power and wealth in a repressive Big-Business-Big-Government partnership. This drift leads down the road toward a new and subtly manipulative form of corporatist serfdom. The phrase 'friendly fascism' helps distinguish this possible future from the patently vicious corporatism of classic fascism in the past of Germany, Italy, and Japan" (Gross, 1980, p.xi). Similarly, Carl Boggs acknowledges the new historical circumstances of the late 20th and early 21 century in which the "concentration of power, even in reactionary hands, is much less likely to be monolithic, and it would probably not have to be. In a highly rationalized global system...there would scarcely be any justification for the more heinous elements of fascism: widespread terror, concentration camps, overt forms of racism and ultra-nationalism, wars of aggression. A far more plausible outcome than any despotic Leviathan is the second one---steady growth of concentrated economic and political power in the framework of already existing rationalized state capitalism" (Boggs, 2000, pp.163-164). Specifically, in the context of producing weapons of mass destruction, it is military state capitalism that structures social relations. According to Seymour Melman, "in military state capitalism, military activity---building and operating armed forces and their industrial base---is the primary activity of government" and is characterized by three basic features: (1) separation of the work of decision making from that of producing; (2) hierarchical organization of decision making; and (3) an imperative among the managers to enlarge their power both within and outside the hierarchy" (Melman, 1991. p.649). Exclusionary governance is reinforced though military state capitalism and with its strengthening, there is a corresponding betrayal of democracy. The United States has been operating under military state capitalism since 1945. From 1949-1989, the total budget of the Defense Department (in 1982 dollars) was $8.2 trillion. That sum was greater than the monetary value of civilian industry's plant equipment and of the nation's infrastructure in 1982, a total of $7.3 trillion. This investment also has rationalized the view of America as the "world's policeman" and, as such, our racial inferiors in the Third World must be brought into line by the application of American high-tech military power. This hegemonic ideology promotes the idea that Americans have "racial inferiors" throughout the Third World. This hegemonic ideology reveals a classic insight into the mentality of the exclusionary state (ES), as well as its denial of the principles outlined in the Nuremberg Charter. The ideology is also especially relevant with respect to the genocidal implications of nuclearism (Paupp, 2000, p.73). In the task of confronting military state capitalism, Melman recognizes "achieving peace requires more than a pause between wars...The short-term goal must be the disarmament of the state-managed war-making institutions, by a process of economic conversion and negotiated disarmament. These processes must be pursued in ways that contribute to replacing the managerial, power-hungry, repressive and incompetent war-making institutions of militarized state capitalism" (Melman, 1991, p.668). Yet, in the year 2001, the proposed Star Wars missile defense of the Reagan years has resurfaced not as a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), but is proposed under the banner of a National Missile Defense (NMD). Institutionalized military state capitalism, not "rogue states" are the driving force behind the NMD initiative. In the "back-to-the-future" world of 2001, the "Star Wars profiteers---Boeing, Lockheed Martin, TRW and Raytheon, that together accounted for 60 percent of all missile defense contracts in the last two years---constitute the real Rogues Gallery" (Martin, Glick, Ries, Nafziger, and Swier, September 2000, p.31). A $14 billion taxpayer-subsidized purchase of Mc Donnell Douglas in 1997 made Boeing, the nation's second largest war profiteer and NASA's top contractor. Together, these corporations have spent approximately $40 million on campaign contributions and lobbying expenses from 1998-2000 to ensure that they will continue to receive funding for NMD. Meanwhile, between 1983 and 1997, there has been almost no trickle-down of economic growth to the average family. In response, Jeff Gates maintains that "by the standards of any functioning democracy, these disturbing and fast-accelerating trends would be addressed as a national crisis deserving even a special session of Congress devoted to crafting a cure". Instead, neither political party mentions it so that "leadership-wise, mediocrity reigns supreme while uninhibited selfishness and wanton greed roam the land, disguised as personal freedom, even liberation, as today's cramped view of freedom pushed democratic responsibility into the shadows" (Gates, 2000, p.31). It appears as though exclusionary governance and the exclusionary state (ES) rules supreme vis-à-vis the auspices of militarized state capitalism. Exclusionary governance as a mode of operation and as a mode of discourse also shapes the definitions and conceptual categories in which deterrence and security are defined. This conclusion is evident given the fact that "despite the collapse of the Soviet empire, three key features of international life remain unchanged---the anarchic structure of the international political system, states that place national before supranational interests, and the nuclear revolution in military technology" (Goldstein, 2000, p.13). Behind all six dimensions of exclusionary governance, within the dominant nuclear states, are the ideological buttresses of the technological discourse created by the "wizards of Armageddon"---the corporations, the scientists, the national and international military industrial complex (Kaplan, 1983). They are the authors of the constantly changing and adjusting ideological matrix in the world's national security states who transformed the emphasis of national security discourse in the twentieth century from Cold War logic to the search for rogue states and rogue enemies. In this context, the high priests of weapons of mass destruction and of proposals for a United States "National Missile Defense" (NMD) have forged an agenda that violates basic principles and postulates in both moral and legal discourse. Both moral and legal discourse leads us to remake and revise a world that lives within the shadow of weapons of mass destruction. The nature of moral discourse, in this context, means that "to see reality is to be wholly present at the crucifixion of the world; to live reality is to enter into that crucifixion, but to do so, in the phrase of Albert Camus, as neither victim nor executioner" (Douglas, 1966, p.3). Yet, the processes of exclusionary governance, which gave birth to the nuclear state and guide it to new levels of maturation, has created a world of both executioners and victims. In this process, exclusionary states and establishments have been willing to offer up the sacrifice of both humanity and the entire earth in this process. This reality constitutes the vertical link of the nuclear crucible where morality, ethics, and the fate of humanity are placed in the balance, in a revolt against an insanity and injustice spawned by the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Such a situation demands opposition and revolt against its injustice. This is necessarily the case insofar as "to revolt against injustice is at the same time to revolt for life, life in the world and life in oneself" (Id., p.9). If the life of the world itself is to be preserved the sanctity of its life needs to be acknowledged as the transcendent value. The life of the world and its future should not be subordinated in any nation's national security establishment, individually or collectively. Yet, we continue to live in an age in which the moral discourse and moral demand for global peace and nuclear abolition are submerged discourses. The dominant or hegemonic discourse of the age continues to reside in delusions of Orwellian proportions and double-speak. In short, as C. Wright Mills wrote, "it is this mindlessness of the powerful that is the true higher immorality of our time; for with it, there is associated the organized irresponsibility that is today the most important characteristic of the American system of corporate power" (Mills, 1956, p.342). C. Wright Mills, Jacques Ellul, Robert Jay Lifton, and Robert Michels, all have written of the dangers of irrationality and moral irresponsibility under the auspices of a power elite governed by the law of expediency, reinforced by propaganda, and caught in the matrix of the "iron law of oligarchy". Mills cautioned that "laws without supporting moral conventions invite crime, but much more importantly, they spur the growth of an expedient, amoral attitude" and that, as a consequence, "a society that is merely expedient does not produce men of conscience" (Mills, 1956, p.347). In turn, the reliance upon expediency exposes the increased reliance upon propaganda and the reintroduction of Hitler's "Big Lie" technique as a means of obfuscating the demands of moral discourse and opens the gates for amoral accommodations. In this regard, the moral implications of propaganda in the nuclear age are enormous. Ellul has suggested that the propagandist has the capacity to mobilize man for action that is not in accord with his previous convictions because "modern psychologists are well aware that there is not necessarily any continuity between conviction and action and no intrinsic rationality in opinions or acts. Into these gaps in continuity propaganda inserts its lever. It does not seek to create wise or reasonable men, but proselytes and militants" (Ellul, 1965, p.28). Additionally, Robert Jay Lifton has written of a kind of "nuclear fundamentalism" which leads to vicious circles of nuclear entrapment" (Lifton and Falk, 1982, p.80). The net result of this nuclear fundamentalism is that "bomb-induced futurelessness becomes a psychological breeding ground for further nuclear illusion, which in turn perpetuates and expands current arrangements..." (Id., p.80). And, in the expansion of current arrangements, political parties play their supporting roles. From the perspective of a concern with a more democratic and egalitarian society, Robert Michels' book, Political Parties, is a pessimistic book. First published in 1911, Michels' famous "iron law of oligarchy" was set out with the observation that "it is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy" (Michels, 1999, p.15). In this statement, Michels laid down what would come to be the major political argument against Rousseau's optimistic concept of popular democracy that underlies most traditional democratic and socialist theory. In this book he analyzes the tendencies that oppose the realization of democracy, and claims that these tendencies can be classified in three ways: dependence upon the nature of the individual; dependence upon the nature of the political structure; and dependence upon the nature of organization. These three classifications demand and deserve greater attention and explication in reference to the threat to humankind posed by weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, I shall now turn to an examination of each of them. 1. The Nature of the Individual and the Potential for Nuclear Holocaust In this matrix of bomb-induced futurelessness there are many possible reactions, including the embrace of all-or-none idea systems and institutional structures, which Lifton calls "ideological totalism" in which "there is a collective effort to reassert the endless life of a group (the 'Thousand-Year Reich,' for instance)" (Id., p.82). Such a collective effort, however, may cross the boundary line into the practice of genocide. The masters of the Nazi holocaust have had their crimes replicated to greater and lesser degrees elsewhere, from the killing fields of Cambodia in the 1970s to Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. The distinguished legal scholar Raphael Lemkin fought hard to establish the importance of the concept of genocide, as defined by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, as "a denial of the right to existence of entire human groups" (Paupp, 2000, p.72). In view of this history, psychologist Robert Jay Lifton and sociologist Eric Markusen wrote in their book, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat, that: "We believe that our efforts here to explore common patterns in Nazi genocide and potential nuclear genocide are in the spirit of Lemkin's work...Both Nazi and nuclear narrative are crucially sustained by certain psychological mechanisms that protect people from inwardly experiencing the harmful effects, immediate or potential, of their own actions on others" (Lifton and Markusen, 1990, pp.12-13). The nuclear crucible continues to sacrifice both the individual and the well being of collective humanity vis-à-vis a Nazi/Nuclear narrative, which induces a psychological sense of denial, which inoculates those who adopt it against feeling the full weight of personal moral responsibility for a potential nuclear holocaust. The psychological surrender is tantamount to a surrender of moral responsibility. The effect of this process is twofold: on the one hand, it frees the individual from making choices and decisions which are then abdicated to the guardians of the nuclear arsenals and, on the other hand, it empowers the guardians of the nuclear arsenals to effectively ignore democratic demands for disarmament and nuclear abolition, thereby ensuring the maintenance of patterns of exclusionary governance through an exclusionary state (ES) (Paupp, 2000, pp.51-112). In the alternative, inclusionary governance seeks to de-emphasize limited and self-limiting concepts of national security (which emphasize threats to the nation-state) and re-conceptualize security as something that is both common and comprehensive. As the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (the Palme Commission) concluded in 1989, the very destructiveness of modern war, even in its conventional forms and derivations, has become so terrible that was has lost its meaning as an instrument of national policy. Further, it leaves the root causes of conflict unresolved. Hence, the need for replacing traditional notions of security with notions of "inclusionary security" and "common security" is more apt to address the root causes of conflict and serve to obviate reliance on force or weapons (Paupp, 2000, p.87). In the absence of new notions such as inclusionary security and a common security framework to support it, I believe, as Michel suggests, that democracy will fail to be realized in the decision making processes which will determine the ultimate fate of weapons of mass destruction. 2. The Nature of the Political Structure and the Potential for Nuclear Holocaust The organization center for the congruence of these forces is found in the national security state (or, the national insecurity state). The national security bureaucracy since the days of President Truman is testimony to this phenomenon. The blending of bureaucracy with technology has been transubstantiated in "technocracy". Its effect upon the political structure is antidemocratic insofar as the nature of technocracy leads to a culture of "apocalyptic concealment". The culture underlies not only the armaments culture, but lies at the center of the nuclear state, the embodiment of the most deadly form of an exclusionary states (ES). Its exclusionary nature corrupts the political process, as well as the media, which reports on it. In place of a sense of anguish there is a deterioration of public discourse (Paupp, 2000, p.72). With the deterioration of public discourse, democratic discourse has become a casualty of the national security state. Franz Neumann's critique of law within the context of the oppressive totalitarian state may be applied with equal force to a critique of the nuclear monopoly of terror and the political structure that supports, funds, and maintains it. Neumann asserts that "the technological progress (the conditio sine qua non of cultural progress) is used today largely for armaments." The problem arises when there is no set timetable for ending the union between technology and arms production. On this matter, Neumann wrote that "no threat to the political system of democracy can arise if the fruits of advancing technology are diverted from normal use for a relatively short time. But our historical experience tends to show that a long range postponement of expectations is possible only in a wholly repressive system" (Neumann, 1953, reprinted in, The Rule of Law Under Seige: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, 1996, p.222). Between 1945 and 2001, the United States government produced a repressive system in the name of "national security," not unlike Latin American versions of "La Patria," which have justified the suspension of constitutional norms, the imposition of a "state of siege," and the imposition of anti-democratic initiatives (Paupp, 2000, p.95). The concentration of authority in the American nuclear establishment is highly exclusionary for with the adoption of barriers between government and citizenry in the policy area most critical to national and global survival "this characteristic non-accountability and non-controversiality of nuclear weapons policy naturally inclines policy in directions favored by the militarist cast of mind, which enjoys a permanent presence in the bureaucratic structure" (Falk, 1982, p.205). The legacy of the national security state is, in the final analysis, the final denouement of freedom in a democratic society. As Karl Jaspers observed in his book, The Atom Bomb And The Future Of Man, "whoever thinks that life may be worth living in a world that has been turned into a concentration camp must consider that confidence in man is justified only insofar as scope remains for freedom. This scope is the premise of man's potential. Mere life as such, under consummate total rule, would not be the life of animals in the abundance of nature; it would be an artificial horror of being totally consumed by man's own technological genius" (Jaspers, 1961, p.167). Such an outcome can and does have the potential to place church and state at odds. From a moral perspective, man's technological genius, as exemplified in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, have betrayed the moral imperative of the Barmen Declaration of 1934, which juxtaposes the person and message of Jesus Christ and his Church with the claims of loyalty made by the state upon citizens to subordinate their individual and collective conscience to the dictates of the national security state. The words of the first article of the Barmen Declaration, written by Karl Barth and adopted on May 31, 1934, by the confessing church in Nazi Germany, state: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me" (John 14:6). "Truly, truly, I say to you, anyone who does not enter the sheepfold by the door but climbs in by another way, that person is a thief and a robber. I am the door, if anyone enters by me, they will be saved" (John 10: 1, 9). Jesus Christ, as he is attested for us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God which we have to hear and have to trust and obey in life and death. We reject the false doctrine, as through the Church could and would have to acknowledge as a source of its proclamation, apart from and besides this one Word of God, still other events and powers, figures and truths, as God's revelation" (Barth, 1962, p.239). In his short commentary on Article I of Barmen, Karl Barth makes four main points. First, is the one Word of God, Jesus Christ demands our exclusive loyalty. Second, compromises of loyalty will slowly devastate the church. Third, in spite of the history of compromise, the Word of God remained. Fourth and finally, in actual practice the confessing church stood or fell by whether loyalty was maintained to Jesus Christ as the one Word of God (Hunsinger, 2000, pp.95-96). Reflecting on this moral reading of Barth and the Barmen Declaration of 1934, Hunsinger has argued that "Karl Barth's insights cannot be applied to America today unless we see that what he has to offer is a very non-utilitarian version of Christianity. Loyalty to Jesus Christ is not the means to an end. It is, rather, the supreme end by which all other ends are judged and in which all worthy ends are included, though in practice there may be times when even worthy ends will need to be sacrificed for the sake of the supreme end" (Hunsinger, 2000, p.96). It is because Jesus Christ demands exclusive loyalty, as proclaimed in scripture and confirmed by Barth and the confessing church through the Barmen Declaration, we can see that theology and church in the post-1945 period continued to take a different path by complying with the mandates of the national security state, even when such compliance was in violation of the Word of God, which demands resistance. What was missed was the fact that the confessing church must be a church of nonconformity. In short, "the cross is not a resigned acceptance of limitations or of injustice in an imperfect world but the cost of nonconformist existence." In this task, "no church which compromises its witness, either for the sake of avoiding suffering or for the sake of supposed effectiveness, can be truly faithful to its calling" (Hunsinger, 2000, p.106). In regard to opposition to the maintenance and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, and the state and technology supportive of it, the task that remains for the Christian in the most powerful of nations is to negate a politics of violence and of negation. As Jurgen Moltmann, Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Tubingen, Germany, wrote in, The Crucified God, "the theology of the cross had to be worked out not merely for the reform of the church but as social criticism, is association with practical actions to set free both the wretched and their rulers" (Moltmann, 1973, p.73). In the absence of a theology of the cross that unites the mission of the church with social criticism, Moltmann warns that, "men who have not found their freedom in the humanity of God but, for whatever reason, feel anxiety at this God and the freedom that is expected of them, cling to the law of repressions...They hope for the absolute from relative values and eternal joy from transitory happiness. Instead of resolving conflicts, they construct aggressive images of enmity and make their enemies into demons in order to kill them spiritually. But because man knows at heart that in so doing he is making excessive demands of things, other men and himself, his anxiety remains" (Id., p.301). Reliance on violence, through reliance on weapons of mass destruction, constitutes an idolatrous loyalty to the nation state. This conclusion is necessarily the case insofar as loyalty to the nuclear weapons state constitutes a betrayal of Christ and his church. 3. The Nature of Organization and the Potential for Nuclear Holocaust Richard Falk has argued "from either a moral or international law perspective, it is virtually impossible to vindicate reliance on nuclear weaponry" (Falk, 1982, p.137). Yet, the political leadership of organizations, corporate and governmental, finds itself in a profound dilemma. This is especially the case for political leaders insofar as "either they peer deeply into the moral and legal status of nuclear weapons, thereby undermining the legitimacy of nuclearism, or they refuse to acknowledge such difficulties and undermine the legitimacy of their leadership by failing to face this most basic challenge" (Falk, 1982, p.138). The moral failure to even acknowledge the dilemma extends the oppressive outreach of Washington as the world is presented with "a pretext for permanent emergency" (Id., p.139). In this context, "the decay of democracy has itself impaired our capacity for response" (Id., p.141). The impairment of any genuine democratic response and opposition to the growing and unresolved threat of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious moral, political, legal crisis. To recognize this crisis of democratic impairment reveals that there is too little functional democracy in the United States, not too much. In fact, the organizational and bureaucratic walls that surround the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the private corporations which contract for greater investments in a national missile defense (NMD), must be confronted so that moral and legal claims can also be extended to democratic protests against the conventional trade in arms. In other words, the interjection of moral accountability is required with respect to "defense expenditures" so that such expenditures may be critiqued and evaluated from perspectives that are not driven by either profit or power, but are informed and judged by a higher standard---the dignity and value of life on this planet. In this respect, William Hartung has noted that "whether any president will have the political courage and the staying power to take on the permanent arms sales establishment that has shaped U.S. policy for the past twenty-five years will depend in large measure on how much pressure he or she gets from the American people" (Hartung, 1994, p.298). Part of the difficulty in raising levels of political pressure on these policies is associated with an established creed based on force. As the alternative faith to the non-violent creed of love expressed by the moral code of Jesus, Karl Jaspers observed of the violence-oriented political world of power struggles that, "it has been the basic phenomenon of historic existence that time and again, in powers seeking world domination, a faith confessed as a creed and taught and trained as the only true faith has had frightful consequences" (Jaspers, 1961, p.264). In the case of weapons of mass destruction, as Falk suggests, it is virtually impossible from either a moral or international law perspective to vindicate reliance on nuclear weaponry. Justification for weapons of mass destruction must, of necessity, make an end run around the perspectives of both morality and international law standards, values and codes by retreating into laws that are "laws" in a purely technical sense (Ellul, 1964, p.133). Therefore, the divorce of moral discourse from the nuclear weapons debate has had to be confronted and overcome. To that end, in June of 1982, a group of Catholic bishops began meeting to draft a comprehensive statement on nuclear war. By the time of the revised third draft, the bishops' "Pastoral Letter on War and Peace" had enunciated the following points: 1. Condemnation of any use of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal against civilian or military targets located near cities. 2. Prohibition of first use of weapons against any targets. 3. Prohibition of any nuclear weapon likely to be released by accident. 4. Recommendation of immediate, bilateral verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production, and deployment of new strategic systems, followed by negotiated bilateral 'deep cuts' in the arsenals of both superpowers. 5. Rejection of any attempt to achieve superiority in the nuclear balance. (Winters, 1983, pp.23-29). Not since the Barmen Declaration has the Christian Church taken such a strong and unmitigated stand against state policy. From the standpoint of the organizational church and the theological viewpoint of Karl Barth (from the Protestant side), there is a center and a periphery to the message of the gospel that need to be kept eternally distinct. Yet, in the final analysis, "together gospel and political application form one circle, one unitary whole. When to stress their unity depends almost entirely on the situation. Not every political issue of the day demands a decision from the church, but for those like National Socialism that do, the decision must be forceful and clear-cut" (Hunsinger, 2000, p.84). So also, in the 1980s under Reagan, in the 1990s under Clinton, and in the 2001-2004 era under Bush, the issue of weapons of mass destruction and NMD demands a decision in the United States that is morally and legally forceful and clear-cut. The very fact that no such clear-cut decision currently exists or is likely to be produced presents us with what the law calls a res ipsa situation---the thing speaks for itself. Such a decision could not be made defensible from a moral or legal viewpoint. Further, today's political parties at best play a supporting role in a "politics dominated by an intense mosaic of political elites engaged in carefully targeted strategic activation...Meanwhile, government remains a complex bureaucratic web of policies, each policy the concern of a particular set of candidates, bureaucrats, and elected officials...Popular control of government is less sure as a result" (Schier, 2000, pp.87-88). This is especially the case with respect to the decision-making process within government as to the use of nuclear weapons to bring about a particular policy result (Krieger, March/April, 2001, pp.8-11; Schell, January 2000, pp.41-56). In the case of the Vietnam war, it has been noted that "the critical disagreement between the JCS and the civilians related not to the pace of American military action against the North but to how far it would go, and specifically to whether it would eventually include the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to compel Hanoi to give up. In the end...that question was never completely clarified" (Kaiser, 2000, p.371). In 1961, the first year of the Kennedy administration, the JCS made their own recommendations to the president regarding SEATO Plan 5, which contemplated their preferred option to ensure the defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. While the Kennedy administration expanded American ground forces, at least the JCS had abandoned Admiral Radford's 1956 plans to defend South Vietnam with a few regimental combat teams armed with tactical nuclear weapons. Contemplating potential Chinese intervention, the issue of the authorization to use nuclear weapons was back on the table, as far as the JCS were concerned. The Chiefs answered Robert Kennedy's query at the meeting of August 9, 1961 regarding what would be necessary in response to Chinese escalation and they "confirmed Kennedy's suspicion that the war would become massive and perhaps nuclear. The President remained unlikely to accept such plans, but one service had also produced a smaller-scale plan tailored to fit the situation in South Vietnam" (Kaiser, 2000, p.97). Two years into his term, President Kennedy was still trying to implement his own ideas regarding certain critical cold war issues. Among them, while ruling out nuclear war as a realistic option, he still felt that the United States needed a limited military option that would enable Washington to replay to Soviet actions in Berlin or elsewhere (Id., p.199). Kennedy's views on this matter were consistent ever since taking office when he was immediately at odds with the JCS over Cold War strategy insofar as "the Chiefs had thoroughly absorbed the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of treating nuclear weapons as conventional weapons, but the President was apparently appalled" (Id., p.43). After the events of November 22, 1963, however, presidential restraint was removed in contemplating the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of both war and foreign policy. In 1968 and in 1972, the Johnson and Nixon administrations did just that. Both of these administrations "threatened the use of nuclear weapons to varying degrees, and both may seriously have discussed it at one time or another, but such an option was not politically feasible either domestically or internationally" (Id., p.378). With respect to nuclear weapons, the policies and perspectives of the Johnson and Nixon period contrast sharply with Kennedy's views. For example, in 1961, Kennedy shied away from war in Laos when he realized that the United States "would be outnumbered on the ground and that the military would count on nuclear weapons to redress the balance" (Id., p.378). Additionally, he avoided war in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis largely because of fear of nuclear escalation (Pious, Spring 2001, pp.81-105). In fact, "whatever else the Cuban missile crisis might have been, it was certainly not an example of successful crisis management" (Id. P.92). Insofar as "crisis management and game playing require effective control over the pieces on the board" the fact is that given the number of near misses in the crisis involving these pieces points to the conclusion that any one of these near misses "might have caused a cascading set of events to result in a nuclear holocaust" (Id., p.93). Therefore, the "secret deal" to remove IRBM Jupiter missiles in Turkey was the true source of resolution in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a resolution born of diplomacy and politics. Therefore, "if we can learn anything useful from Kennedy's performance, it is that the art and science of politics and diplomacy, not gamesmanship and the methods of crisis management, are the keys to successful resolution of nuclear crises" (Id., p.105). The tragedy of Vietnam, in part, is that Johnson, McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk "tried to ignore the pitfalls of the policies and strategies the Eisenhower administration had left behind: that the United States had undertaken to defend many areas on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used as necessary and that nuclear weapons could be effective. The Joint Chiefs seemed to assume that these policies remained in force" (Kaiser, 2000, pp.378-379). Within the matrix of this nuclear crucible, the civilians "who wanted to preserve a nuclear option even if in practice they might never authorize it, failed to see, as Kennedy had in 1961, that the only alternatives to the use of nuclear weapons were an unpopular and indecisive conventional war on the one hand, or an immediate political solution on the other" (Id., p.379). Hence, the challenge is to create a more inclusive politics (Id., p.222). A politics inclined toward diplomacy abroad and full disclosure home. Yet, even that will not be enough without a president who is willing and able to educate that people about the risks and dangers, for an informed citizenry is required. And the combination of a media hostile to democratic discourse through inclusion and active engagement in a comprehensive and serious debate leaves the challenge of creating a more inclusive politics even more elusive. In the case of 1962, "Kennedy's failure in the Cuban Missile Crisis involved his abdication of the moral responsibility to educate the American people and rid them of their delusions of how the world works...He was willing, for political advantage, to leave the American people with the most dangerous illusion of all: the White House could 'manage' a superpower nuclear crisis and with sufficient military force could resolve it on terms favorable to the United States" ((Pious, 2001, p.104). At least by June of 1963, in his American University address, Kennedy advocated the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty. In so doing, he had developed and was matured by the crisis, which suggests that "Kennedy's insight into the pathology of the Cold War had sharpened with experience" (Oliver, 1998, p.187). Therefore, in viewing Kennedy's commitment to and signing of the Nuclear Test Ban of 1963, it is difficult to "disassociate Kennedy's eloquent and determined exposition of this concern from his growing comfort with the responsibilities and duties of Presidential leadership" (Id., p.187). It is also clear that Kennedy privately expressed the view that nuclear weapons made a secure and rational world impossible and that it was important to find a means to get rid of nuclear weapons (Twigge and Scott, 2000, p.315). In the year 2001, however, the lack of will and vision in American leadership, capable of taking the nuclear issue in a more enlightened direction, indicates that it is captive of an ancient cabal of the power elite. Therefore, the question that begs to be answered is: "Can a movement based on hope, confidence in the concerted powers of human beings, and faith in the human future be as great as one based on terror?" (Schell, 1998, p.17). Part of the answer to the question is the moral one. The other part of the answer is from the international law perspective. It is to the issue of the legality versus illegality of weapons of mass destruction that I now turn. THE LEGAL CRUCIBLE International law intersects with moral issues with regard to weapons of mass destruction. It is this intersection that creates the nuclear crucible that characterizes the post-1945 context in which the world finds itself on the brink. The role of international law as a force in the context of international relations has traditionally relied enforcing restraints in the laws of land warfare by treaty, but such restraints are not limited to treaties. Long ago, the famous "Martens Clause" of the Preamble to the 4th Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, introduced a very broad legal yardstick which was intended precisely for those situations in which no specific international law convention existed to prohibit a particular type of weapon or tactic. In pertinent part, it states: "Until a more suitable code of the laws of war can be drawn up, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not covered by the rules adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and governance of the general law principles of the law of nations, derived from the usages established among civilized peoples', from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience" ["Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907)," in, L. Friedman, editor, The Law of War: A Documentary History, Random House, Volume I, 1972, p.309]. In the year 2001, the Eurocentric notion of notion of legal usages "established among civilized people" varies across a wide spectrum, from differing visions of human rights to NATO's barbarism in its "humanitarian" war in the Balkans and the Kosovo of the late 1990s. Further, the "laws of humanity" do not necessary include the views of Third World states and are, therefore, filled with omissions as to critical concerns that neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism, and neo-liberalism have conveniently overlooked and intentionally ignored. Finally, the "dictates of public conscience", in an age of propaganda and a media-saturated monopoly plagued by censorship, are left without the means to attain the velocity of moral outrage, political comprehension, or legal sensibility. Therefore, while the Hague Convention of 1907 is an important starting point in assessing the international law implications of weapons of mass destruction, its primary value in the 21st century is the explicit recognition of the legal perspective that the law of war is not only to be found in treaties. In fact, the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 was confronted with a similar problem in charging the Nazi leadership for war crimes in World War II in the absence of prior definitions of crimes against humanity or crimes against peace. In response to this situation, the Nuremberg judgment concluded that: "The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in customs and practices of states, which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. The law is not static, but by continued adoption follows the needs of a changing world..."[Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume 22, 1950, p.445]. At the dawn of the 21st century, the relevance of the combined force of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the holding of the Nuremberg judgment is that "the legality of nuclear weapons cannot be judged simply by the existence or lack of a treaty rule specifically prohibiting or restricting their use. Instead, the legality of nuclear weapons must be judged in light of the various sources of international law, i.e., international treaties and conventions which limit the use of force in war; the fundamental distinctions between combatant and non-combatant and between military and non-military targets, which provide the main foundation upon which the laws of war have been built; and the principles of humanity, including a prohibition against on weapons and tactics that are cruel in their effects and cause unnecessary suffering" (Falk, et al, 1980, p.559). The sources of international are varied. In large measure, the content of international law is "overwhelmingly associated with norms generated by intergovernmental behavior. The Nuremberg approach represented itself as an innovative attempt to insist that the idea of accountability extended to political leaders. However, in retrospect, the Nuremberg claim has not induced a law-making process capable of restraining or apprehending governmental leaders who exceed the bounds of normative authority. Similarly, the United Nations, as a mechanism of the global community, has been unable to make any serious inroads on state sovereignty vis-à-vis war-making discretion" (Falk, et al, 1980, p.592). Still, it is important to outline the substantive prohibitions found in the Nuremberg Charter, which paid attention not only to the malign conduct of belligerents in war, but also the attention it paid to the crimes of conspiracy, planning, and threatening to commit the crimes of murder and other inhumane acts. The following table outlines the key prohibitions of the Nuremberg Charter, which have direct bearing upon the production, deployment and potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Substantive Prohibitions Found in the Nuremberg Charter The following are crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility. (a) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. (b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder, or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the high seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. (c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during war, or prosecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. ___________________________ SOURCE: A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Law of War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, and reprinted in David Kauzlarich and Ronald C. Kramer, Crimes of the American Nuclear State-At Home and Abroad, Northeastern University Press, 1998, p.32, and reprinted in Terrence Edward Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000, p.74. Additionally, insofar as weapons of mass destruction serve to guarantee "mutually assured destruction" (the doctrine of, MAD), the crime of planetary suicide may be placed upon our analytical trajectory in assessing, with the greatest clarity, the exponential dimensions of the nuclear crucible. Richard Falk and others have demonstrated the fact that "never has any conventional war had the potential for destroying the biological identity, possibly even the reality, of the human race, or the economic and ecological viability of the planet. Indeed, the genetic and environmental effects alone resulting from the use of nuclear weapons provide a compelling humanitarian argument against their legality. The existing norms of international law strongly support arguments by analogy for their prohibition" (Falk, et al, 1980, p.595). These norms also include the law-making authority of the United Nations that has upheld the contention that the Nuremberg Principles are, in a genuine sense, a vital part of international law. Hence, just the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity. In this manner, the United Nations General Assembly has contributed a certain legal force to the moral argument about the status of nuclear weapons. However, the degree of this contribution remains a matter of controversy. Suffice it to say that the strength of the moral argument in this context has been reinforced by numerous assertions in Vatican documents and Papal declarations. Among them is this Vatican II assertion: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities and their inhabitants, is a crime against God and against humanity". In point of fact, by 1996, the International Court of Justice, with its issuance of an advisory, became---for the first time in human history---an international tribunal that had directly addressed the nuclear weapons issue as an unresolved threat to humanity. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ had engaged in "forging a consensus that lend lends strong, yet partial and somewhat ambiguous, support to the view that nuclear weapons are of dubious legality" (International Court of Justice Statute Art. 5592, and: Paupp, 2000, pp.66-70; Nanda and Krieger, 1998). The advisory stands as an opinion of great weight on the legality of nuclear weapons (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No 95---Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996), because it made the argument for prohibition. Nuclear weapons are still primarily the product of and in the decisional domain of the nation states that possess them. As such, nuclear weapons serve to maintain an inherently exclusionary global hierarchy. Similarly, Richard Falk has stressed the point that "the morality of the state system is built around the primacy of state interests as conceived by governmental leaders" and that the "use, development, and role of nuclear arms have been almost entirely determined by considerations of state power". This leads to the inevitable conclusion that "there is little reason to suppose that such considerations will not prevail in the future, as they have in the past, in determining whether additional governments will decide to develop, deploy, and use nuclear arms. Government leaders may pursue self-destructive policies based on the narrow interests of their ruling groups and may, further, be entrapped within horizons of time and security which are far too short from even the perspective of national well-being" (Falk, 1984, p.466). In response to this situation, I have maintained the necessity for a different approach to national and global governance "insofar as the history of the international law system has been an exclusionary, hierarchical war system, the mandate provided by international law to move toward inclusionary governance restores to human beings the freedom to transform exclusionary states into inclusionary states. Greater degrees of inclusion have the capacity to transform governance by deepening democracy within and between nations" (Paupp, 2000, p.98). If nuclear issues have remained largely within the exclusive domain of governmental elites and bureaucratic systems that are inherently anti-democratic, it follows that the very notion of authority is what has to be understood and re-defined from a moral and legal perspective. In other words, we must ask: "what and who is truly authoritative in this life-and-death context?" In this regard, the juxtaposition of militarism and human rights law underscores the argument that a human rights agenda can only be comprehensively implemented within a framework of peace. In other words, there are two opposed sets of authoritative law that operate by contradictory criteria. If one rises, the other must of necessity fall. To recognize this dialectic as a global reality and not merely theory is to acknowledge that "militarism has neither created a world of peace and stability, more protected the human right to physical security. Overemphasis on military superiority undermines the ability to build regimes of trust and harmony. The arsenals of the war system are symptoms of deep conflict" (Felice, 1998, p.35). Arsenals of weapons of mass destruction and associated proposals to keep them in play (i.e., a national missile defense advanced by the United States), can only paralyze the building of inclusionary forms of governance while, at the same time, strengthening existing system of exclusionary governance that propagate the global war system. In this critical regard, "arms control and disarmament and the demobilization of armed forces are prerequisites to providing the institutional framework within which nations may pursue implementation of the corpus of international human rights law" (Id., p.35). The legal environment may be more precisely understood, as McDougal suggested, as one where "the rules commonly referred to as international law and national law are but perspectives of authority---perspectives about who should decide what, with respect to whom, for the promotion of what policies, by what methods---which are constantly being created, terminated, and recreated by established decision makers located at many different positions in the structures of authority of both states and international governmental organizations" (McDougal, 1981, p.487). The challenge presented to us at the dawn of the 21st century is to establish contending perspectives on authority---perspectives that would have the capacity to question the justifications and rationale of deterrence, which justifies investment in the weapons of mass destruction. The challenge is obviously not a new one in the history of military and legal discourse. In fact, "the outbreak of World War I in 1914 demonstrated how vulnerable international law was to the aggressive policies of a nation ready, willing, and able to employ military force" (Maguire, 2000, p.70). This vulnerability was clear in considering "war crimes". The whole notion of "war crimes" first came into existence and was widely used during and after World War I. However, the employment of war crimes accusations were mainly used as a propaganda tool "to fuel the outrage necessary for modern war" and a significant "number of people in Britain and France began a movement that aimed to try the German Kaiser after World War I. The German Government feared war crimes prosecution for a different reason. The ever-practical General-Staff believed that if common soldiers were encouraged to examine orders as international legal questions, military discipline would disintegrate" (Id., p.71). Today, in the 21st century, the United States government is afraid that its own citizens, if exposed to the international legal questions surrounding weapons of mass destruction, may refuse to fund further investments in either the weapons themselves or in a national missile defense shield. In remarks prepared for the 20th anniversary of the Voice of America, on February 26, 1962, President John F. Kennedy declared: "We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign ideas, alien philosophies, and competitive values. For a nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people" (Kennedy, 1962, p.163). A little over 40 years later, on June 21, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld was questioned by Senate Democrats about the high cost and unproven effectiveness of a national missile defense system, and they raised deep concerns about the administration's threats to withdraw from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty if the Russians refused to amend it (NYT, June 22, 2001, A1 and A14). Rumsfeld was greeted by a unified skepticism from liberal and centrist Democrats. Senator Carl Levin, a Democrat from Michigan and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked Rumsfeld: "Would you agree it is possible, at least, that they could respond in a way to a unilateral withdrawal which would not be in our interest, that would make us less secure?" Rumsfeld responded that it was possible, but he added, "we're not hostile states. They are going to be reducing their weapons regardless of what we do. We're going to be reducing our nuclear weapons to some level, regardless of what they do" (Id., A-14). Rumsfeld's non-responsive answer highlights the crisis of exclusionary governance in the United States, the lack of fidelity that the United States has demonstrated to an existing treaty that, by the standards of international law, should not subject to unilateral abrogation. It may be amended or replaced in conjunction with Russia, but the point is that, as the New York Times editorial writers observed, "in future years the ABM treaty would serve as a bridge to a new era" (NYT Editorial, June 15, 2001, A-30). In the alternative, if the Bush administration acts to jettison the ABM treaty, Russian fears of a resurgent United States, feeling protected by its shield, will place Russia in a subordinated and threatened position in the future, most probably leading toward a second Cold War and the build up nuclear arsenals---not their reduction. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, for example, has written, "With the ABM treaty as its root, a system of international accords on arms control and disarmament sprang up in the last decades. Inseparable from this process is the creation of global and regional regimes of nuclear nonproliferation. These agreements, comprising the modern architecture of international security, rest on the ABM treaty. If the foundation is destroyed, this interconnected system will collapse, nullifying thirty years of efforts by the world community" (Ivanov, as quoted in, The Nation, June 25, 2001, p.14). Ivanov's argument is not a new one. It was prefigured on the American side in 1969 when, in early February of that year, Senator Edward Kennedy suggested to Abraham Chayes and Jerome B. Weisner that it would be useful, in the forthcoming Congressional debates over the decision to deploy an antiballistic missile system, if the Congress had available to it an independent non-governmental evaluation of the ABM issue. An evaluation was undertaken and a report resulted, entitled, ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, (Wiesner, et al, 1969). In the introduction to the report, Senator Kennedy stressed that, "to chart this course, we must stop depending upon concepts and information that have no true relevance to the current world situation. Yesterday's justifications for yesterday's policies should concern the historian; and while they offer lessons for today's policies, they must not determine them. We are too often too quick to accept recommendations for national defense policies without putting their justifications to a rigorous examination. There is nothing sacrosanct about the recommendations of the Department of Defense. The Congress should put them to the same scrutiny it applies to all other government programs" (Id., p.xiv). Augmenting Kennedy's assessment was former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's observation, that prefigures that of Russia's current Foreign Minister Ivanov's view, when McNamara asserted that the "so-called heavy ABM shield---at the present state of technology---would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. That...would make it necessary for us to respond in turn---and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side" (Id., p.243). The use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 had produced an indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. From the standpoint of international law, the fact that a civilian population is a primary target during a war fought with nuclear weapons is our starting point for analysis insofar as it is also the central premise of assured destruction with a partial annihilation or extermination of that population as its most likely result. Such a result stands in the shadow of Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter that declares that the extermination of a civilian population, in whole or in part, is a "crime against humanity". Hence, "to recognize the legality of nuclear weapons, given their capacity and tendency to terrorize and destroy the civilian population, would virtually eliminate the entire effort to constrain combat, at least in large-scale warfare, through the laws of war" (Falk, et al, 1980, p.566). The Geneva Protocol in Article 51 (2) states: "The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack, acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited". Further, Article 51 (4) states: "Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited". Article 51 (4) (c) specifies indiscriminate attacks as "those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol". Article 51 defines the essence of an indiscriminate attack as one that is "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians and civilian objects without distinction". By the time of the 1980 election and the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan to the presidency, missile-defense advocates around Reagan were simply purists of the Republican right. As such, "few of these people were technical or military experts; they simply believed that the U.S. should pursue the arms race in every area of military technology. For purists the whole arms-control process was a dangerous trap, and the ABM Treaty the worst of all agreements, precisely because it was the foundation of all the rest" (Fitzgerald, 2000, pp.118-119). At its heart and center, the crusade to destroy the foundation of arms control was to create weapons which, "if they materialized, could contribute to an offense, as well as provide a defense for the United States" (Id., p.499). The creation of such an offensive capacity triggers the reality of the illegality of both the production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction as well as their placement in outer space. The reality of the illegality is more than a technical nuance. The illegality goes to the means through which dominance and domination are designed to occur vis-à-vis that technology. For with the ultimate purpose that of control and domination through terror, the employment of such a technology is truly beyond the limitations envisioned by Geneva Protocol, the principles of the Nuremberg Charter, the various United Nations conventions and prohibitions against genocide, and the moral critique of the Barmen Declaration as well as the Catholic bishops "Pastoral Letter". Despite all of these prohibitions, between 1983 and the fall of 1999, the United States had expended $60-billion dollars on anti-missile research, and "though technical progress had been made in a number of areas, there was still no capable interceptor on the horizon" (Fitzgerald, 2000, p.498). The irony is that should such a technology appear, its very appearance, its very existence, not to mention its production and deployment would by definition become a violation of both legal and moral sanctions with respect to weapons of mass destruction. It would further wipe away any remaining technical boundary between annihilation and the constraints of the legal and moral aspects of the nuclear crucible. As such, even in the name of "self-defense", the laws of war would seem virtually meaningless insofar as "it would be a fait accompli that nuclear weapons abolished the weapons of war" (Falk, et al, 1980, p.568). CONCLUSION Ever since the end of 1945, the world has never been the same because of the introduction of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons defined the underlay the great strategic games and confrontations of the Cold War---from Korea and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, from the Vietnam War to investments in "star wars" (SDI), revised calls for a national missile defense (NMD), and the symbolic destruction of the Berlin Wall. Now, along with the increased dangers of nuclear proliferation are the attendant social and economic dangers of undemocratic globalization. In the year of 2001, a new millennium brings in its wake the two dominant themes of the post-Cold War years---globalization and democratization. The research for and control of nuclear weapons are subject to the criteria of neither of these themes. Weapons of mass destruction reside both at the center and periphery of global consciousness, accountable to a power elite that remains exclusive and exclusionary in its policy-making and decision-making. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have pointed out how "it is paradoxical...that a global debate has not emerged on resolving the contradiction between a commitment to democracy and an undemocratic global order" (Falk and Strauss, January/February 2001, p.220). We may also add the unaccountable and irresponsible drift of military and political policy-making with respect to weapons of mass destruction. Insofar as the state-system has protected and maintained a monopoly on the production and use of weapons of terror in violation of major moral and international legal codes and mandates, it would seem that, in general terms, "to all those concerned about social justice and the creation of a humane global order, a democratic alternative to an ossified, state-centered system is becoming more compelling" (Id., p.220). I seek to present such an alternative in this conclusion. I seek to identify the mutually reinforcing nature of the issues involved and their interrelationship to one another. In so doing, the following seven "sustaining norms of nuclear restraint" may be understood as emerging from the paths of what I am calling, "inclusionary governance" (Paupp, 2000, pp.84-112). The global processes associated with a deepening of democracy demand accountability and an end to imperial intentions, politics, and norms. I maintain that the violence in the current order of power and threats to research, produce, deploy and use weapons of mass destruction is a global reflection of exclusionary states (ES) and exclusionary practices which have embraced militarization as a means of maintaining not only international hierarchy, but also the power which comes from the maintenance of class, ethnic, religious and regional cleavages. The violence of the current order and its reliance upon weapons of mass destruction is the very antithesis of inclusionary governance and its mortal enemy. This assertion may be supported by numerous examples from the realm of international law as well as international declarations and covenants. I choose to highlight the "Delhi Declaration" of 1978 as a key example of the inclusionary impulse expressing itself as a political and legal mandate to engage in the renunciation of nuclear weapons as legitimate instruments of war. The "Delhi Declaration" called for the entire world to be made into a nuclear weapons-free-zone. The Declaration proposes the immediate negotiation of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, outlining its principal features insisting that serious negotiations to make it happen be held. Such an approach needs to be resurrected in the aftermath of the U.S. Senate's 1999 defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). To achieve this goal, the seven factors associated with the realization of inclusionary governance, in the context of "the nuclear crucible", are presented. (1) Structures and policies that allow for the continued investment in and expansion of both nuclear and non-nuclear assets shall be dismantled and replaced with peacekeeping and monitoring institutions. (2) In recognition of the fact that spending on nuclear and non-nuclear assets depletes First and Third World economies, it shall be the task of inclusionary governments and inclusionary regimes to embark upon the deepening of democratic norms, practices and policies so as to alter current spending priorities. (3) The necessity to embark upon a path toward inclusionary governance and demilitarization is supported by accumulated scientific evidence, which provides sufficient proof that the exchange and/or detonation of just a few nuclear bombs will have the capacity to create a global condition known as "nuclear winter" that could lead to climatic catastrophe, agricultural collapse, and world famine. (4) The history and evolution of international law is moving in the direction of disarmament and has the capacity to build a global institutional structure that supports an alternative security system. Such a system must lead toward the effective subordination of the military establishments of the nation-states under the rubric of values, principles, policies, and goals of the inclusionary governance. (5) The historical experience of war and conflict has proven that a failure to recognize the influence of pre-existing beliefs has implications for decision making and that, therefore, the process of decision making must become more inclusionary so as to overcome a history and practice of concealment, secrecy, and distortion through propaganda as well as bureaucratic and media manipulation. (6) Genuine security and a peaceful world order cannot be premised upon notions of "deterrence" and "balance of power" because a spiral of violence is created by these concepts so that the exercise of power becomes self-defeating. (7) The recognized need for a global security policy which places emphasis upon non-military incentives to channel government's behavior empowers the international system to give added support to an expanded role for international organizations or security regimes to facilitate cooperation and to regulated inter-group conflict. [Paupp, 2000, pp.84-104]. Insofar as these seven principles represent a recognition of the need to build a new consciousness within human beings for the future of humanity and the earth itself, these principles emerge from an inclusionary consciousness which seeks peace, an end to further waste in the investments of nations for war and dubious conceptions of what actually constructs genuine security and peace. To emerge from the shadows of the nuclear crucible, therefore, it is necessary to realize that "action can no longer be done simply out of even the most profound attachment to humankind. Action must be done from an even deeper source, an even deeper passion---the passion for the Divine. Action for humankind will be inevitably soured by disappointment and tragedy, darkened by the endless defeats that anyone fighting for peace or justice, or love in this world is bound to suffer as we confront the stupidity of the politicians and the greed of the bankers and the death-merchants. As we confront the infinite lust for blood that will rages in the heart of humanity, we will know disappointment, tragedy, disillusion, the 'Bosnia-zation' of the world as neighbor attacks neighbor, and the collapse of all values...Action truly, deeply, and most effectively springs from an absolute passion for the Divine, not just for humankind itself; an absolute passion to be a pure mirror for the Divine, and a claim and absolute passion to be the channel through which divine justice, divine purity, and divine love flow" (Harvey, 1994, p.198). 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