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Burma: The
Military Boots Keep Marching in Place
Written by Rene Wadlow

Aung San Suu Kyi
Photo from www.indymedia.org
The Burmese military have held power in the country since 1958
and show no signs of yielding it to civilian political leaders.
They have prevented discussion of the most burning political
issues which have divided Burma since independence: the nationalities
question, the insurgencies, the balance of power between central
and regional governments, the nature of the state, and the role
of democracy. The military, by means of poor policies and incompetent
administration took a relatively prosperous country and turned
it into a state of economic chaos.
There was a brief 1960-1962 period
when Prime Minister U Nu was restored to power while General
Ne Win waited in the wings. Ne Win came to center stage again
in 1962 and ruled the country with a small group of fellow officers
calling themselves the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP).
However, unlike the Chinese Communist Party - Ne Win's inspiration
- the BSPP had no local members, no cells, no party structures
and no conferences. The BSPP resembled many one-party states
of Africa where the single party is only a reminder of an earlier
administrative style. Real power is administered through the
military hierarchy. Under Ne Win's direction, Burma closed in
on itself. It was not active in the Non-Aligned Movement and
was part of no regional grouping. The one civilian Burmese leader
of value, U Thant, was pushed outside and became Secretary General
of the United Nations.
The military leadership has been
both corrupt and incompetent. They weakened administrative services,
schools, health care and the state infrastructure despite a bloated
public sector of underpaid and inefficient civil servants. Many
educated Burmese left the country for jobs in Britain, Canada
and Australia; other Burmese joined the merchant marine in order
to be able to feed their families.
Burmese diplomats at the United
Nations made strenuous and finally successful efforts to have
Burma designated one of the "least developed countries".
Burma joined 'the Club', made up of mostly African states in
1987. However, other than attending a conference every five years,
there is little advantage in 'Club' membership.
The military prevented discussion
of the most burning political issues which have divided Burma
since independence: the nationalities question, the insurgencies,
the balance of power between central and regional governments,
the nature of the state, and the role of democracy.
By 1988, economic failure, lack
of social services, and an oppressive atmosphere preventing discussion
led to student protests. University students have always been
the leaders of reform movements in part in memory of the 1936
student strike in Rangoon which was the most visible cry for
independence. In March 1988 during "seven days that shook
Rangoon", there was a remarkable series of non-violent protests,
led by students, younger Buddhist monks, and young professionals.
The demonstrations received a good deal of sympathy from the
wider public whose economic conditions were worsening due to
ever-rising prices.
The military hit back with large-scale
arrests of students and shootings of demonstrators. Unrest continued
and on 8 August there was a general strike and massive street
demonstrations in Rangoon. Tens of thousands demanded democracy,
human rights, an end to the socialist economic system, and the
resignation of the BSPP government. The movement began to spread
beyond Rangoon. The army intensified its crackdown, and many
student leaders left the country for Thailand or the border areas.
The military, however, recognized the seriousness of the crisis.
General Ne Win resigned and some of the military in his cabinet
were also 'allowed' to resign.
A slightly modified group of
military officers retained power but to indicate that a change
had taken place they called themselves the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) and dropped all mention of the "'Burmese
road to socialism'. They changed the name of the capitol from
Rangoon to Yangon and Burma to Myanmar. Since there had been
wide international criticism, especially at the UN, of the brutal
crackdown upon students, the SLORC decided that there should
be elections in order to confirm their legitimacy.
SLORC had hoped to continue the
military's monopoly of power following the holding of the promised
elections, through a classic policy of 'divide and rule'. The
idea was to create a multitude of political parties built around
personalities from each section of the country. In all, 93 parties
with no previous legal existence were created for the election.
The anticipated result would be a divided parliament through
which SLORC would continue in power by the building of fragile
coalition governments.
In order to facilitate this plan,
the election procedure was weighted against the creation of a
mass party. No election meetings of more than five people were
allowed. Party publications were limited; no access to radio
was given. Leaders of the potentially stronger political parties
were put in jail or under house arrest.
Confounding the military's plans,
one party - the National League for Democracy (NLD) with Aung
San Suu Kyi as its secretary general - won 392 of the 485 seats
in parliament. A set of ethnic parties, collectively called the
Union Nationalities League for Democracy and allied to the NLD
won 47 seats, while the political party most allied to the SLORC
gained only 10 seats. The SLORC was so out of touch with popular
sentiment that they were surprised by the results. Had they had
reliable opinion polls on which to base their decisions, chances
are they would not have permitted the elections to go ahead at
all. Since the elections, for over 16 years the SLORC has had
to invent reasons why the Parliament cannot meet.
As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi
has become increasingly the symbol of democracy and of a Parliament
unable to come into being. Auug San Suu Kyi represents a new
spirit - partly because, unlike many of her contemporaries, she
has lived most of her life outside Burma and is, in consequence,
not linked to existing political compromises. Her father, Aung
San, who died when Aung San Suu Kyi was two years old, was one
of the original 'Thirty Comrades' - student nationalists, also
including Ne Win, who were inspired by Second World War Japanese
propaganda which appealed for a common Asian struggle against
Western imperialism. Aung San went to Tokyo to assist the Japanese
conquest of Burma. By 1944, however, the Thirty had decided that
the Japanese were not liberators, that the occupation of Burma
was being carried out for Japanese rather than Burmese aims,
and that the Japanese might also lose the war. In the last year
of the Second World War, the Thirty co-operated with Lord Mountbatten.
Thus, on 27 January 1947, Clement
Attlee and Aung San signed an agreement for full independence
of Burma within a year. On 19 July 1947, Aung San was assassinated
by a political rival. He became a legend of Burmese independence.
Aung San Suu Kyi was educated
in India (where her mother served as ambassador) and at Oxford
University. She married an English academic, Michael Aris, a
specialist on Tibet, in 1972 and only returned to Burma in 1988
in order to care for her dying mother. Her dynamism, combined
with the legend of her father, led her to being named secretary
of the National League for Democracy. She toured the country
and was welcomed enthusiastically. She always stressed the importance
of non-violence in pressing for democracy against the military.
The SLORC does not care for symbols
it does not control. Since July 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi has been
most of the time under house arrest, cut off from most communication,
including with her own family. The government refused an entry
visa to her husband Michael Aris, who was dying of cancer. He
died without being able to see her. It is impossible to know
from outside how strong and how structured the democratic forces
in Burma remain. Many democratic Burmese have left the country
and are often active in pro-democracy activities.
The major change from the 1962-1988
period is that now Burma is open to the world and the winds of
trade. Burma has become a major opium exporting country. Opium
is the main export of the country, sent over land through China,
Bangladesh, and Northeast India, leaving a trail of ruined lives
and conflicts among middlemen along the way. The other major
export, largely undocumented, is tropical wood to Thailand. The
Thais have limited their forest cutting, having already destroyed
much of their forest lands. The Thais buy their wood from the
Burmese military - a trade under the control of higher officers
on both sides.
China is the chief beneficiary
of the new Burmese openness. The Chinese government sells Burma
arms of all sorts but especially cheaply-made land mines which
are planted in frontier areas where the ethnic minorities live.
Chinese merchants, probably not pushed by the government but
following an age-old pattern of Chinese migrating to do business,
are taking over the hotels, restaurants and shops of Burma, selling
Chinese goods. As hardly anything is made in Burma, it is natural
for the Chinese to sell Chinese goods. As a result China is one
of the only open defenders of Burma at the UN.
The military keep marching in
place, without vision, without policy, taking what they can while
power lasts, but their footprints make ever deeper ruts all the
time.
Rene Wadlow is editor of the online journal of world
politics www.transnational-perspectives.org and an NGO representative
to the UN, Geneva. Formerly, he was professor and Director of
Research of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University
of Geneva.
For more resources:
For a moving account of the
1988 protests and crackdown, including many interviews with participants
see: Bertil Lintner Outrange: Burma's Struggle for Democracy
( London: White Lotus, 1990, 208pp.)
For an effort to understand
why the military continue in power despite economic and administrative
incompetence and why so few Burmese democrats criticize the military
as such, see the useful analysis by an anthropologist interested
in the psychological effects of military rule: Christina Fink.
Living Silence: Burma.
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